Bombed Away: How the Second Circuit Destroyed Fourth Amendment Rights of U.S. Citizens Abroad by Crandall, Carla
BYU Law Review
Volume 2010 | Issue 2 Article 14
5-1-2010
Bombed Away: How the Second Circuit Destroyed
Fourth Amendment Rights of U.S. Citizens Abroad
Carla Crandall
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carla Crandall, Bombed Away: How the Second Circuit Destroyed Fourth Amendment Rights of U.S. Citizens Abroad, 2010 BYU L. Rev.
719 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss2/14
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010 3:55 PM 
 
719 
Bombed Away:  How the Second Circuit Destroyed 
Fourth Amendment Rights of U.S. Citizens Abroad 
“Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it 
uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law.”1 
—Walter R. Mansfield 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
many believe the United States began charting a new course by 
which civil liberties were sacrificed in order to protect national 
security interests.2 Yet even before those events, the United States 
had been targeted by international terrorism and the U.S. 
government had been forced to face the issue of how to address 
related threats within a legal framework.3 This Note focuses on an 
example of one such pre-9/11 attack; namely, the August 7, 1998, 
simultaneous bombings by al-Qaeda of the U.S. Embassies in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. While those attacks seem to 
have occurred eons ago in the chronology of international terrorism, 
a lingering related case has raised new issues pertinent not just to 
terrorism, but to criminal justice as a whole.  
Specifically, in a surprisingly unheralded decision stemming from 
those bombings, the Second Circuit held in In re Terrorist Bombings 
 
 1. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing United States 
v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 2. See, e.g., John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American 
Liberties in a Dangerous Digital World, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 509, 510 (2005); Alissa 
Clare, Note, We Should Have Gone to Med School: In the Wake of Lynne Stewart, Lawyers Face 
Hard Time for Defending Terrorists, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 651, 654 (2005); Tara M. 
Sugiyama, Note, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional 
Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 156 (2006).  
 3. For example, indictments and/or criminal prosecutions were pursued in response to 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1994 plot to plant bombs on U.S. air carriers 
flying over the Pacific Ocean, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military barracks 
in Saudi Arabia. See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement 
Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 310–11 (2003); see also Department of Justice, 
Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) 
(highlighting both historic and current terrorism related prosecutions). 
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of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment Challenges) that 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is inapplicable to 
extraterritorial searches of U.S. citizens, even if those searches are 
conducted by U.S. officials.4 Though the searches in the case related 
to international terrorism, the Second Circuit’s ruling did not create 
a related, narrowly tailored warrant exception, but instead applied 
across the board to any type of investigation that U.S. officials might 
conduct overseas against U.S. citizens. While the court stated that its 
decision was based in part on the fact that there was no precedent 
establishing that the warrant requirement should apply in such 
circumstances, this Note argues that the opinion actually signaled a 
significant and deleterious change in the approach toward protecting 
the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizens abroad.  
Part II of this Note begins with a discussion of the Fourth 
Amendment itself, including an examination of what protections the 
Amendment provides and why they are provided. Part III discusses 
whom is shielded by the Amendment’s provisions and then, in order 
to establish a general framework for discerning when the Fourth 
Amendment is applicable, this Note provides an overview of 
important case law related to this issue. With this framework 
established, Part IV focuses specifically on Terrorist Bombings and 
explains the facts, procedural history, and rule of law to emerge from 
that controversy. Part V concludes with an analysis of the case and, 
given the developed law in this area, a critique of the decision 
reached by the Second Circuit.  
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Before moving specifically to Terrorist Bombings, this Part 
provides a framework for examining the Fourth Amendment issues 
presented by the case. First, it explores the relevant provisions of the 
Amendment, including the warrant and reasonableness 
requirements. The following section explains how the Supreme 
Court has enforced these requirements upon the executive branch in 
various circumstances. Specifically, it chronicles the development of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as applied to extraterritorial 
searches of nonresidents, searches conducted against persons within 
 
 4. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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the United States, and extraterritorial searches conducted against 
U.S. persons.  
A. Provisions of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation.”5 While the plain language of this 
Amendment might at first appear clear, its actual application has 
been less so; in fact, one Supreme Court Justice commented that 
“[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches . . . has not—to put 
it mildly—run smooth.”6 One of the most fundamental issues relates 
to the prerequisites that must be met in order to conduct a 
constitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. On one hand, 
the Amendment may be read in such a way that it establishes two 
different rights—one prohibiting unreasonable searches and one 
requiring probable cause to support any warrants that are in fact 
issued.7 Alternatively, the Amendment may in fact declare that a 
search is only reasonable when a warrant, establishing probable cause, 
is obtained.8 Though this exercise may seem somewhat academic in 
light of well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement9—
which by their very existence would seem to render the second 
reading impossible—it is nevertheless important insofar as it 
establishes the presumptions behind Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In other words, by recognizing these exceptions to 
the requirement as “exceptions,” the Court has implicitly indicated a 
presumption in favor of obtaining a warrant. 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 7. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 8. Id.; see also POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
COMMON LAW 130–31 (1982).  
 9. Well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement include consensual searches, 
exigent circumstance searches (as, for example, when evidence is being destroyed, or officers 
are in “hot-pursuit” of a suspect), administrative searches, and searches incident to arrest. INGA 
L. PARSONS, FOURTH AMENDMENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005).  
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1. The warrant requirement 
Beyond simply implying a presumption in favor of search 
warrants, however, the Court has in fact repeatedly made explicit 
declarations favoring them. The Court has noted, for example, that 
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.”10 And even in creating one of the most 
prominent exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Terry Court 
was careful to highlight that “police must, whenever practicable, 
obtain advance judicial approval of searches . . . through the warrant 
procedure.”11 Thus, while there are indeed exceptional situations 
wherein a search warrant will not be mandated, the Court has 
nevertheless been clear as to what is the background norm. 
Because the Court has been so persistent and adamant regarding 
this warrant requirement, it is worth briefly exploring the rationale 
behind such a position. While there are undoubtedly a number of 
reasons for the Court’s posture, two justifications are particularly 
worthy of examination here. The first rests on the nature of the right 
to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court 
noted over a century ago that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”12 Indeed, as the Supreme Court 
explained more recently, the Fourth Amendment “codified a pre-
existing right”13 to be free from unwarranted government searches 
that rested on principles of natural rights and natural law.14 With this 
understanding, it is easier to appreciate the gravity of the warrant 
 
 10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted); see also 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (“There are exceptional circumstances in 
which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may 
be contended that a magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 
347; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Chapman, 365 U.S. at 610). For a more 
comprehensive study of Terry and the related “Terry stops,” see POLYVIOU, supra note 8, at 
231–59.  
 12. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 13. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., John P. Feldmeier, Note, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: 
Constitutional Alchemy of the Fourth Amendment, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 521 (1991). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010 3:55 PM 
719 Bombed Away 
 723 
requirement since “the Fourth Amendment does not purport to 
create a right,” but instead simply “enjoins government from 
violating a right assumed to exist.”15 In other words, warrants serve 
the function of creating “clear and unquestionable authority” for the 
government to conduct searches that would otherwise violate an 
inviolable right, and accordingly, the warrant requirement should 
not be lightly disregarded. 
A second justification for the Court’s strong presumption in 
favor of a search warrant centers on constitutional principles of the 
separation of powers, which ultimately exist to protect individual 
rights. More directly, the Court has noted that to effectuate a 
legitimate search, a “neutral and detached magistrate [is] required by 
the Constitution.”16 Though this necessity is not explicitly set forth 
in the Constitution, its structure does imbue each branch with such 
checking functions on the other branches. Indeed, in expounding 
upon this notion, the Court has said: 
 The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement 
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence 
sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to 
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search 
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity . . . .17  
Such language indicates an acknowledgment by the Court that when 
the warrant requirement is jettisoned from the Fourth Amendment, 
the rights of those subjected to searches are left to the unfettered 
prerogative of the executive. In recognition of the fact that such 
“unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures   
. . . and overlook potential invasions of privacy,”18 the Court has 
 
 15. Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial 
Power and the United States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 147, 169 (1999). 
 16. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971); see also Shadwick v. City 
of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348–50 (1972); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967). 
 17. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (citation omitted). 
 18. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (citing NELSON B. 
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 79–105 (1937)). 
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stated that “those charged with [] investigative and prosecutorial 
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally 
sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”19 
2. Reasonableness 
As important as the warrant requirement clearly is, there is no 
doubt that the Fourth Amendment also requires that searches be 
“reasonable.”20 Since the main focus here is on issues pertaining to 
the warrant requirement, a thorough examination of the 
“reasonableness requirement” necessarily falls beyond the scope of 
this Note. There are, however, a few things worth highlighting as 
predicates for analysis of the Terrorist Bombings case. First, the Court 
has declared that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness,”21 and “the balancing of competing interests.”22 
Under this rubric, “the permissibility of a particular law enforcement 
practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interest.”23 Flowing from this is the observation that 
the Court has repeatedly indicated that reasonableness is context-
dependent.24 Thus, there are no bright-line rules for the 
reasonableness of searches, and the inquiry will instead depend on 
the circumstances surrounding each search.25 Finally, it is also 
important to recognize that the prohibition against unreasonable 
searches applies at both the initiation and the execution phases.26 In 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. As noted previously, and despite the arguments presented above, some 
commentators have even suggested that, in light of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
it is arguable that the exclusive mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that a search be 
reasonable. POLYVIOU, supra note 8, at 131. Notably, however, Polyviou also asserts that the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment generally requiring a search warrant “command[ed] 
the support of the Supreme Court” at least at the time of his publication. Id.  
 21. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
 22. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring). 
 23. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 24. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“Reasonableness . . . is 
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (“The reasonableness of an official invasion of the 
citizen’s privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that 
invasion occurred.”). 
 25. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39. 
 26. Rachael A. Lynch, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Fourth Amendment Right: 
Samson Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees Lose 
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other words, it must first be reasonable to perform a search, and then 
the search itself must be carried out in a reasonable manner.  
Though reasonableness has been declared the “touchtone” of 
the Fourth Amendment, this last point suggests that a reasonableness 
determination still hinges, in most cases, upon the warrant 
requirement. The government official designated by the 
Constitution as the decider of whether a search is reasonable is a 
member of the judiciary. As noted above, this is because a judicial 
officer can examine probable cause evidence in a neutral and 
detached manner. While some suggest that determinations of 
reasonableness can be made ex post—that is, after a search—such an 
argument ignores the judicial officer’s responsibility to ensure that 
initiating a search in the first place is reasonable.27  
In sum, it suffices on this point to highlight the Court’s 
recurring language insisting that the Fourth Amendment generally 
requires that a warrant be obtained in order to preserve the 
constitutionality of a search. While there are indeed notable 
exceptions, the fact that such exceptions fail to comport with the 
rationale for the warrant requirement is indicative of the fact that 
they represent anomalies rather than rules. Though the Court has 
indicated that reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment, this could be seen as strengthening rather than 
undermining the warrant requirement, since the warrant procedure 
ensures that a magistrate deem a search reasonable before the 
magistrate even issues a warrant.   
B. When the Fourth Amendment is Applicable to a Search 
The Supreme Court has long-since established that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”28 Though it is not entirely 
clear from the Amendment who these “people” are, it is plain that 
the Fourth Amendment imbues them with certain rights. This 
section examines the Court’s approach to the question of whether 
 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 41 AKRON L. REV. 651, 676–77 (2008); Stacy E. Roberts, 
Note, Bond and Beyond: A Shift in the Understanding of What Constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment Search, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 457 (2002). 
 27. To be sure, in instances where law enforcement officers rely on an exception to 
conduct a warrantless search, this is exactly the type of analysis the judiciary engages in. As has 
been argued above, however, the Court has expressed that warrantless searches should be the 
exceptions rather than the rule. 
 28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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Fourth Amendment guarantees extend to searches in three different 
circumstances; namely, (1) extraterritorial searches of nonresident 
aliens by U.S. officials, (2) domestic searches of such persons within 
the United States, and (3) extraterritorial searches of U.S. citizens. 
By extracting the principles the Court has set forth in these 
situations, a framework can be established for application by 
extension to Terrorist Bombings.  
1. Extraterritorial searches of nonresident aliens by U.S. officials 
Whether or not constitutional provisions generally do, or should, 
apply to nonresident aliens is an issue subject to debate.29 While an 
in-depth exploration of this question is not necessary here, it is 
important to give a brief examination of the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to nonresident aliens. One of the principal 
questions in this area is whether nonresident aliens fall within the 
contours of “the people” discussed in the Fourth Amendment. In 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court answered this inquiry 
by defining “the people” as: “a class of persons who are part of a 
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”30 Consequently, the Court held that a nonresident 
alien, whose home in a foreign country had been searched without 
warrant by U.S. authorities, was not entitled to the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment because he was not “one of the people.”31 
In explaining this result, the majority went to great lengths to 
highlight Verdugo-Urquidez’s status as a nonresident alien. Indeed, 
the Court noted that “it was never suggested that the [Fourth 
Amendment] was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal 
 
 29. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global 
Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007); Jon Andre Dobson, Note, Verdugo-Urquidez: A Move 
Away from Belief in the Universal Pre-Existing Rights of All People, 36 S.D. L. REV. 120 
(1991); Leah E. Kraft, Comment, The Judiciary’s Opportunity to Protect International Human 
Rights: Applying the U.S. Constitution Extraterritorially, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1073 (2004). 
 30. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (citing U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 
(1904)). It is this language that has given rise to the phrase “U.S. persons”—the term of art 
that is used in portions of this Note. Significantly, it is still not entirely clear who this group 
entails, though it is clear that it encompasses those with “voluntary attachment to the United 
States” who also have a “sufficient connection” to the United States that they can be 
considered part of the community. Id. at 265, 274–75. 
 31. Id. at 265. 
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Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.”32 
Further, although Verdugo-Urquidez had cited several cases that 
seemingly suggested that there was precedent for the applicability of 
the Fourth Amendment in his circumstances,33 the Court 
emphasized that each of the cases he relied on addressed issues 
related either to U.S. citizens, or to aliens within the territory of the 
United States.34 
It is important to stress how vital the Court’s definition of “the 
people” who are protected by the Fourth Amendment was to the 
holding in Verdugo-Urquidez. In determining that nonresident aliens 
were not entitled to the Amendment’s safeguards, the Court appears 
to have relied significantly on principles of social compact theory, 
which suggests that people give up certain rights to a government in 
order to enjoy other benefits it grants. Indeed, the majority cited 
dissenting language from the Ninth Circuit’s Verdugo-Urquidez case 
positing that “the Constitution [is] a ‘compact’ among the people of 
the United States, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
were expressly limited to ‘the people.’”35 Accordingly, as one 
commentator has suggested, “[n]ot being part of the compact that 
surrendered some rights to secure others, nonresident alien targets of 
U.S. law enforcement have . . . no right to challenge the actions of 
the U.S. Government.”36  
Despite the seeming simplicity of such an approach, it is also 
subject to several critiques. First, such social compact ideals reject the 
notion, explained above, that the Fourth Amendment simply codifies 
natural rights.37 In other words, by failing to extend the 
Amendment’s safeguards to nonresident aliens subjected to searches 
by U.S. officials, the Court rejected the notion that such rights were 
in any way pre-existent to their codification. Moreover, the Verdugo-
Urquidez majority created an odd situation whereby nonresident 
aliens are forced to comply with U.S. law even though they only 
receive a portion of its protection when they are prosecuted for 
 
 32. Id. at 266 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at 269–73. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 264 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1231 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting)). 
 36. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and 
International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 444, 453 (1990). 
 37. See Mark. L. LaBollita, Note, The Extraterritorial Rights of Nonresident Aliens: An 
Alternative Theoretical Approach, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 363, 388 (1992). 
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violating it.38 As the dissent put it, this “creates an antilogy: the 
Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce our criminal 
laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this authority, 
the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them.”39 Similarly, 
beyond any rights a defendant may or may not have under the 
Fourth Amendment, it seems troubling to accept the notion that 
U.S. authorities themselves are not bound by it. The majority 
apparently recognized this issue, given its assertion that a U.S. 
warrant “would be a dead letter outside the United States.”40 
Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain why a warrant would not 
increase the search’s legitimacy of police power within the United 
States. 
Notwithstanding these disconcerting issues, however, the fact 
remains that the case does provide a clear indication of the Court’s 
position as to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in these 
circumstances. After Verdugo-Urquidez, it is plain that nonresident 
aliens cannot depend on the Amendment to protect them from 
searches conducted outside the United States, even if U.S. 
authorities execute those searches.41 Equally apparent is that an 
important justification for this rule of law is that such aliens have not 
established a “sufficient connection” with the United States to be 
considered part of the U.S. community. 
2. Searches conducted within the United States 
In stark contrast to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
to overseas searches of nonresident aliens, the Amendment’s 
protections have, for some time, been strictly applied when 
conducted in the United States. That said, there are still intricacies in 
this doctrine that are important for an understanding of issues 
presented by Terrorist Bombings.42  
 
 38. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282. The “portion” of protections refers to the fact 
that the Court did express that nonresident aliens prosecuted in the United States are still 
entitled to certain due process rights codified in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 264. 
 39. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 274 (majority opinion). 
 41. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 8–9 
(1st Cir. 2007).  
 42. Not the least of these issues relates to the collection of foreign intelligence 
information, which in light of the events of September 11, 2001, is an area of the law that has 
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In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States, 
which involved a warrantless wiretap by the FBI of a public phone 
booth in Los Angeles alleged to have been used for interstate 
wagering.43 Despite the government’s assertions that Fourth 
Amendment protections did not extend to a public phone booth, it 
was in Katz that the Court clearly established that the Amendment 
“protects people, not places.”44 Though the Court acknowledged 
that the officers had exercised restraint in initiating and executing the 
search, the majority nevertheless deemed it a violation of the 
suspect’s constitutional rights, since “this restraint was imposed by 
the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”45 Indeed, the agents 
had not been “required, before commencing the search, to present 
their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral 
magistrate . . . [and] were not compelled, during the conduct of the 
search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a 
specific court order.”46 Without such judicial oversight, the Court 
recognized that an individual’s rights would be secure only to the 
extent permitted by the executive’s discretion, a scenario that was 
unacceptable under the Constitution.47 After Katz, it was thus clear 
“that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.”48 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Katz, however, and one 
which presaged the pending explosive debate about the necessity of 
obtaining a warrant for intelligence collection, was a footnote in the 
opinion directed at the issue. Specifically, the majority noted that 
“[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate 
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the 
national security is a question not presented by this case.”49 This 
footnote prompted Justice White to write in a concurring opinion 
 
undergone drastic change in recent years. It is important to keep in mind, however, the scope 
of this Note and its focus on events that occurred in the late 1990s. 
 43. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 44. Id. at 351. 
 45. Id. at 356. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 358–59. 
 48. Id. at 357. 
 49. Id. at 358 n.23. 
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that a warrant should not be required if the President or Attorney 
General deemed a search necessary for national security purposes.50 
Feeling “compelled to reply” to Justice White’s opinion, Justice 
Douglas in turn underscored the difficulty with such a scenario in 
our constitutional system.51 The executive branch, he said, is not 
neutral and detached, nor should it be. Instead, “it should vigorously 
investigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute 
those who violate” the law.52 Nevertheless, because “spies and 
saboteurs” are protected by the Fourth Amendment as much as any 
other criminal, Justice Douglas asserted that the interposition of a 
neutral and detached judicial official is necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the process and to ensure that civil liberties are not 
sacrificed in the pursuit of justice.53  
The exchange between the two Justices is remarkable because it 
foreshadowed the clash in the late 1960s and early 1970s (not to 
mention in the post-9/11 era) between protecting “national 
security” interests and securing personal freedoms. That conflict 
came to a head in United States v. United States District Court 
(“Keith”).54 The suit sprang from charges related to the bombing of 
a CIA office in Michigan.55 In preparation for the trial, the 
defendants filed a motion to compel the government to disclose 
surveillance information collected as part of their investigation.56 The 
government in turn filed an objection with an affidavit from 
Attorney General John Mitchell explaining that the searches had 
been conducted at his direction, without warrant, in the interest of 
national security.57 The Court was thus squarely presented with the 
issue of whether the executive branch could dispense with the 
warrant requirement in a domestic search if the purpose of the search 
was to collect national security information.  
In resolving the matter, the Court addressed fundamental issues 
of our constitutional system, including presidential authority and 
 
 50. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 359–60 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 360. 
 54. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The convention of referring to this case as “Keith” relates to 
the fact that Judge Keith was the district court judge who ordered that the government turn 
over the information it had collected. 
 55. Id. at 299. 
 56. Id. at 299–300. 
 57. Id. at 301. 
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separation of powers. The Court was careful, however, in framing 
the question, emphasizing that the Attorney General’s affidavit 
indicated that the searches in this case were directed only at domestic 
threats, and there was otherwise no evidence of foreign 
involvement.58 With this parameter established, the Court began its 
analysis by noting that the Constitution vests the president with the 
duty of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution, a 
responsibility that implicitly includes protecting the government 
from threats of overthrow.59 While acknowledging that this power 
had to be tempered when it abutted civil liberties, the Court also 
noted that “unless Government safeguards its own capacity to 
function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could 
become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be 
endangered.”60 Nevertheless, the question was not whether the 
president had a domestic security role, but instead whether such a 
role had to be exercised in accord with the dictates of the Fourth 
Amendment.61 Citing Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Katz, the 
Court reaffirmed that the Amendment “does not contemplate the 
executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested 
magistrates.”62 Instead, its directives require the interplay of both the 
executive to investigate and prosecute crime, and the judiciary to 
ensure that there is sufficient reason “to justify invasion of a citizen’s 
private premises or conversation.”63 Consequently, the Court held 
that despite compelling justifications to the contrary, the warrant 
requirement applies even to domestic searches conducted for 
national security purposes. To hold otherwise would have failed to 
adequately protect individual liberties and preserve the values at the 
root of our constitutional system.64 
It was thus clear after Katz and Keith that, as a rule, a warrant 
would generally be required for searches conducted within the 
United States. One question that Keith had expressly left open, 
however, was whether the warrant requirement applied to searches 
 
 58. Id. at 308–09. 
 59. Id. at 310. 
 60. Id. at 312. 
 61. Id. at 320. 
 62. Id. at 317 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)). 
 63. Id. at 316. 
 64. See id. 
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within the United States conducted by U.S. agents for the purpose 
of foreign intelligence collection.65 Given this open area of the law, 
lower courts understandably began filling it, though they did so in 
disparate ways. In the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, for 
instance, courts created an exception to the warrant requirement 
whereby the judiciary would not have to pre-approve searches 
conducted under the auspices of foreign intelligence collection.66 
Conversely, in the Watergate-related case of United States v. 
Ehrlichman, the District Court for the District of Columbia declared 
that there was no national security exception to the warrant 
requirement for domestic searches “even when known foreign agents 
are involved” in the criminal activity.67 Likewise, in a separate case, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment’s dictates did not 
yield to the President’s authority over national security issues.68 In 
fact, the D.C. Circuit went so far as to criticize other courts for 
ignoring the question of whether there were “valid reasons for 
abrogating the warrant procedure when foreign relations are 
implicated . . . .”69  
Given this inconsistency, as well as the political and social 
environment of the post-Watergate era, the time was ripe in 1978 for 
Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).70 
Since the Act plays a role in the searches at issue in Terrorist 
Bombings, a very general discussion of its provisions is in order.71 
 
 65. Id. at 321–22 (“[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. 
We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with 
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.”). 
 66. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912–16 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604–
05 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425–27 (5th Cir. 1973). For an 
analysis of these cases, and this issue generally, see Justin M. Sandberg, Comment, The Need 
for Warrants Authorizing Foreign Intelligence Searches of American Citizens Abroad: A Call for 
Formalism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 409–12 (2002).  
 67. 376 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 68. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 69. Id. at 633. 
 70. See Cedric Logan, Note, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 209, 217–18 (2009).  
 71. FISA is a very complex statute, which has undergone numerous changes since 1978, 
so this Note will necessarily only be able to address a few aspects of it. It is notable, however, 
that significant changes were incorporated via the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Pub. L. No. 
107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). The limited scope of 
this Note, however, focuses on events transpired between approximately 1996 and 1998, so it 
will be necessary to focus attention on the state of the law at that time. 
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At its most fundamental level, FISA was enacted as an attempt to 
balance Fourth Amendment rights against the need to conduct 
domestic national security intelligence collection.72 In order to effect 
this purpose, the 1978 Act required that the executive branch (more 
precisely, the President, acting through the Attorney General) obtain 
an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
before conducting a search against U.S. persons for foreign 
intelligence purposes.73 To obtain an order for such a search, FISA 
directed the Attorney General to show probable cause only that the 
target was a foreign power, or an agent thereof.74 Among the Act’s 
most important limitations was that, by its terms, FISA only applied 
to electronic surveillance conducted within the United States.75 
Though a 1994 amendment extended the FISC’s authority to issue 
orders for physical searches, the Act’s territorial aspect—that is, the 
limitation to searches within the United States—was not formally 
extended until 2008.76 As will be discussed in more detail later, the 
reality was that FISA orders were often required even for 
extraterritorial searches. The point here, however, is to accentuate 
that there was no doubt after FISA passed in 1978 that judicial 
interposition in the form of the FISC was required even for foreign 
intelligence collection against U.S. citizens within the United States.  
 
 72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15 (1978) (“The history and law relating 
to electronic surveillance for ‘national security’ purposes have revolved around the competing 
demands of the President’s constitutional powers to gather intelligence deemed necessary to 
the security of the nation and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 73. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–05 (1982). If no U.S. person was targeted, the Attorney 
General was not required to receive pre-authorization, though the Attorney General was still 
required to certify to the FISC that he or she had personally authorized the search. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1802 (1982). A U.S. person was defined, in part, as a U.S. citizen or permanent resident 
alien. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). Interestingly, the FISA Court of Review (the FISC appellate 
court) has asserted that a FISA order “may not be a ‘warrant’ contemplated by the Fourth 
Amendment.” In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 741 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
2002). While acknowledging the merit of arguments supporting this contention, for the 
purposes of this Note, the author accepts arguendo that FISA orders do satisfy the warrant 
requirement. Finally, it is worth noting that the general constitutionality of FISA was affirmed 
in United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 74. Defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978). 
 75. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Title I of FISA was entitled 
“Electronic Surveillance within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes.” Id. 
 76. 50 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994). The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 codified the change 
to the territorial aspect of the Act. 
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Thus, with FISA’s passage, the state of the law regarding 
searches within the United States at the time of the events 
surrounding Terrorist Bombings had generally been established. First, 
it was clear after Katz that domestic searches of U.S. persons for 
strictly criminal investigation purposes generally required a warrant.77 
The warrant requirement had also withstood the attack in Keith, 
wherein the Court had declared that warrants were generally 
required for searches related to domestic security. Though the law 
certainly took a more complex turn after Keith, the bottom-line is 
that FISA directed that a judicial panel pre-authorize any searches 
within the United States carried out upon U.S. persons for foreign 
intelligence collection purposes. In sum, there was no circumstance 
that generally permitted a search on U.S. persons within the United 
States without some sort of judicial review. A gaping hole left 
unaddressed by case law and FISA, however, was whether the 
warrant requirement applied to U.S. persons abroad.78 
3. Extraterritorial searches of U.S. persons  
In Terrorist Bombings, the Second Circuit seems to have rightly 
recognized that “whether a warrant is required for overseas searches 
of U.S. citizens has not been decided by the Supreme Court, by our 
Court, or as far as we are able to determine, by any of our sister 
circuits.”79 Given the aforementioned discussion, the central 
question regarding the applicability of the warrant requirement to 
U.S. persons abroad seems to be whether their circumstances are 
more similar to foreign searches of nonresident aliens, domestic 
searches of U.S. persons, or some combination of the two. This 
inquiry necessarily begins with the question of whether 
constitutional protections, and the Fourth Amendment in particular, 
apply at all to U.S. citizens who are overseas. 
 
 77. The author notes that they are “generally” required only so as to pay homage to the 
well-established exceptions. 
 78. As alluded to briefly above, this hole was filled somewhat with the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008, which requires that a FISA order now be obtained for 
extraterritorial searches of U.S. persons conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. That 
amendment, in fact, has made the foreign intelligence collection issues in Terrorist Bombings 
somewhat moot. In proclaiming that the warrant requirement never applies to extraterritorial 
searches of U.S. citizens, however, the Second Circuit swept in criminal investigations, which, 
as this Note argues, seems inconsistent with the rest of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 79. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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One of the landmark cases dealing with the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution to U.S. citizens is Reid v. Covert, 
which established that the safeguards of the Bill of Rights generally 
extend to cover U.S. citizens abroad.80 The case involved two 
women who had been tried in overseas military tribunals for killing 
their husbands. Though their husbands were in the military, neither 
woman was. Accordingly, they challenged their courts-martial as 
unconstitutional insofar as the courts-martial had deprived them of 
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections.81 Emphatically, the 
Court declared, “When the Government reaches out to punish a 
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other 
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty 
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in 
another land.”82 While Reid centered primarily on Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment safeguards, the Court spoke more generally of the 
applicability of the Constitution abroad. It said, for example, that the 
Constitution manifests that its “protections for the individual were 
designed to restrict the United States when it acts outside of this 
country, as well as here at home.”83 Though there had been 
arguments that only certain rights should extend abroad, the Court 
stated that there was no logic behind suggestions that “picking and 
choosing among the remarkable collections of ‘Thou shalt nots’” 
was appropriate.84  
This line of reasoning was later generally extended to the Fourth 
Amendment, although overseas searches have involved additional 
analysis. Specifically, case law clearly establishes that the applicability 
of even the “reasonableness requirement” of the Fourth Amendment 
to searches conducted against U.S. citizens abroad depends on who 
conducts the search. If foreign officials conduct the search wholly, 
for example, the Fourth Amendment’s protections will not apply, 
even if evidence collected is subsequently turned over to U.S. 
officials pursuing a criminal prosecution.85 The rationale behind this 
rule is that foreign officials cannot be expected to comply with the 
 
 80. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 81. Id. at 3–5. 
 82. Id. at 6. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. Id. at 8–9. 
 85. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976); United States v. Rose, 
570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1969). 
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U.S. Constitution and suppressing evidence they seize would have 
no deterrent effect on their conduct.86 On the other hand, if a search 
is conducted as a so-called “joint venture” between U.S. and foreign 
officials, the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated.87 Such a policy prevents U.S. officials from “attempting 
to shortcircuit the Fourth Amendment rights” of a suspect by tacitly 
condoning otherwise illegal searches solely because they were 
ostensibly conducted by foreign officials.88 Finally, by implication, 
since the Fourth Amendment applies to these joint venture searches, 
it obviously extends to searches conducted entirely by U.S. officials. 
This position generally does not appear to be in dispute, as even the 
Second Circuit in Terrorist Bombings accepted that the searches at 
issue in that case had to adhere to the Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement (though it rejected the applicability of the warrant 
requirement).  
Beyond these doctrines established by case law, FISA has also 
played a role in extraterritorial searches.89 As noted in the previous 
section, FISA, by its terms, was formally limited only to domestic 
searches. Though the contours of the Act may have seemed well 
defined, the reality of its application has been significantly less so. 
More directly, despite the Act’s domestic focus, one expert testified 
before Congress that “the Government often needed to obtain a 
court order before intelligence collection could begin against a target 
located overseas.”90 The principle reason for this rested in the Act’s 
complex definition of electronic surveillance and the fact that 
Congress had not kept it up to date with changing technologies, 
 
 86. See Rose, 570 F.2d at 1361–62. Incidentally, the Rose court recognized a widely-
accepted exception to this rule where the circumstances of the search “shock the conscience” 
of the court. In such cases, the evidence may be excluded, even if the search is conducted 
wholly by foreign officials. Id. at 1362. 
 87. See, e.g., Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743. In order to have a joint venture, U.S. officials 
must “substantially participate” in the search. Id. 
 88. Id. at 746. 
 89. Due to the classified nature of FISA searches, it is difficult to discern to what degree 
any of these searches were conducted against U.S. citizens in particular. Given the testimony 
before Congress outlined below, the author presumes, for the sake of this argument, that 
searches against U.S. citizens occurred in at least some instances. 
 90. Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Kenneth L. 
Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/docs/final-wainstein-sjc-testimony-103007. 
pdf.  
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which often allowed the user to be in a vastly different location than 
a telecommunications service provider.91 While certain government 
officials were critical of the fact that they had to obtain FISA orders 
for such overseas searches,92 their criticisms seem to have rested on 
the fact that foreigners should not be protected by FISA’s 
procedures. This is evident in a statement made to Congress in 2006 
by the National Security Agency’s General Counsel that “the issue 
on which the need for a court order should turn . . . is whether or 
not the person whose communications are targeted is generally 
protected by the guarantees of the Constitution . . . . [P]eople 
outside the United States who are not U.S. persons . . . should not 
receive such protection.”93 Given this language, it seems clear that 
even within the Intelligence Community, there was at least some 
recognition that U.S. citizens abroad should be treated differently 
than foreigners. Indeed, in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Congress itself codified the requirement that FISC orders must be 
obtained before electronic surveillance of overseas U.S. persons can 
be carried out.94  
Thus, while the issue of the warrant requirement’s applicability 
to U.S. citizens overseas had indeed not been squarely addressed by 
the courts or Congress by the time of the Terrorist Bombings case, 
there was clear evidence suggesting a concerted effort on the part of 
both to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of at least U.S. 
citizens. A wrinkle in this analysis, however, is Executive Order 
12,036, which was issued by President Jimmy Carter in January of 
1978.95 This directive permitted warrantless physical searches against 
U.S. persons, but only if the President had generally authorized the 
type of activity involved, and the Attorney General had specifically 
approved its application to the particular search at issue.96 Notably, 
 
 91. Basically, while the actual target of a search may have been in an overseas location, 
he might have been using electronic telecommunications providers either situated in, or in 
some manner passing through, the United States. By its terms, FISA required a FISC order for 
searches of this nature. For more information, see Proposed FISA Modernization Legislation: 
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 8–9 (2007) (statement of 
Mike McConell, Director of National Intelligence).  
 92. See Legislative Proposals to Update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Robert L. Deitz, 
General Counsel, National Security Agency). 
 93. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 94. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2008). 
 95. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978). 
 96. Id. at 3685. 
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this order was issued before FISA was enacted, though President 
Ronald Reagan authorized a similar practice three years after FISA’s 
passage.97 In part 2.5 of the Reagan Order, the President granted the 
Attorney General authority “to approve the use, for intelligence 
purposes, within the United States or against a United States person 
abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if 
undertaken for law enforcement purposes.”98 Importantly, this 
directive still required adherence to FISA, so the order basically only 
extended to warrantless physical searches and activities against 
overseas targets.99 As grounds for asserting such power, the President 
referred to authority vested in him by the Constitution.100 
Of course just because the President asserted such authorization 
did not necessarily make it so. Indeed, there is strong evidence 
indicating that any inherent constitutional power the President may 
have had this area was abrogated by Congress when it passed FISA. 
A seminal case addressing this relationship between Congress and the 
President’s inherent authority is Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. 
Sawyer.101 In Youngstown, Justice Robert Jackson established in a 
concurring opinion a framework through which the interaction 
between the two branches can be examined.102 First, Jackson said 
that when the President acts with congressional authorization, his 
power is at its zenith.103 Next, where the President acts in the 
absence of either congressional approval or disapproval, “he can only 
rely upon his own independent power.”104 Indeed, this is an area 
Jackson called the “zone of twilight” because the powers of the two 
branches may overlap and create uncertainty.105 Finally, when acting 
 
 97. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). Executive Order 12,333 
revoked order 12,036.  
 98. Id. at 59,951. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 59,941. Of note, President Reagan also asserted authority granted in the 
National Security Act of 1947, but as explained below, that Act had no relation to the section 
at issue here. See infra note 107. 
 101. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 102. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Though this was only a concurring opinion, 
later cases indicate the acceptance of Justice Jackson’s reasoning. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006); Crosby v. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000).  
 103. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. 
 104. Id. at 637. 
 105. Id. 
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contrary to congressional will, the President’s “power is at its lowest 
ebb.”106 
At best, Executive Order 12,333 was an example of the President 
acting in the “twilight zone.” Clearly there had been no statutory 
indication from Congress granting the President the authority he 
relied upon in issuing the directive.107 While it can be argued that 
congressional disapproval had not been expressly manifest, and that a 
failure to express such displeasure indicated tacit support for the 
President’s actions, the trajectory of case law and Congress’s failure 
to reverse that tide—as well as FISA’s passage itself—belie this 
argument. In fact, as one commentator has suggested regarding the 
Order, all “available evidence indicate[d] congressional hostility 
toward warrantless searches.”108 Such a posture is especially 
unsurprising given the political atmosphere of the post-Watergate 
era. After investigating government intelligence collection activities 
in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, the Church Committee had 
noted: “We have seen segments of our Government, in their 
attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy, and 
occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes.”109 Of 
course it cannot go unnoticed that Congress did not respond to the 
Reagan Order, but to suggest that this indicates express support 
would be a stretch. Indeed, as the Court has said in other contexts, 
drawing such a conclusion would require “piling inference upon 
inference,” because of an “absence of direct proof.”110 It would first 
have to be assumed, for example, that Congress did not believe that 
FISA had put the issue to rest. Next, it would have to be assumed 
that Congress’s inaction was not the result, for instance, of the 
difficulties associated with the legislative process itself, or of an 
unawareness of the precise dictates and contours of the Reagan 
Order.111  
 
 106. Id. 
 107. As explained above, President Reagan also asserted authority vested in him by the 
National Security Act of 1947. While this may indicate congressional support for some of the 
Order’s provisions, the Act did not grant the President the authority asserted under section 
2.5, the main provision at issue here. 
 108. David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of 
Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 637 (1983). 
 109. S. Rep. No. 94-755, book 2, at 3 (1976). 
 110. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 15 (1954). 
 111. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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The point is, of course, that there are numerous problems with 
viewing congressional inaction to Executive Order 12,333 as 
congressional acquiescence or approval to its directives. In its best 
light, then, Executive Order 12,333 was an example of the President 
acting in the “zone of twilight,” where he could rely only upon 
whatever inherent powers he may have had to authorize the activities 
the Order permitted. Given the conflict in this case between these 
powers and the Fourth Amendment, it seems quite reasonable to 
suggest that Congress felt such powers should yield to other 
constitutional rights. At worst, then, the issuance of the Order 
showcases the President acting at a time when his power was at its 
lowest ebb, since its dictates did not comport with apparent 
congressional will (and certainly judicial intent) regarding the 
appropriateness of warrantless searches—particularly when those 
searches were carried out against U.S. citizens. 
III. TERRORIST BOMBINGS 
With this groundwork established, this Part shifts focus 
specifically to the Terrorist Bombings case. The first section provides a 
summary of facts relevant to an understanding of the Second 
Circuit’s eventual ruling. Next, the Note summarizes the procedural 
history of the case, which is especially important since the Second 
Circuit, while reaching the same ultimate conclusion as the lower 
court, employed distinctly different reasoning to get there. Finally, 
this Part concludes by explaining the four factors the Second Circuit 
used to support its conclusion that the warrant requirement is 
inapplicable to foreign searches conducted against U.S. citizens. 
A. Facts 
While the Terrorist Bombing case involves issues all too familiar 
to Americans today, it began in a time when “al-Qaeda” was not part 
of the average person’s lexicon. American intelligence had been 
investigating Osama Bin Laden, however, since at least 1996, when 
he declared a war of terrorism against U.S. military personnel—a 
threat that he extended to all U.S. citizens in 1998.112 Then, on 
August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda launched one of its first major attacks on 
the United States by simultaneously detonating truck bombs at the 
 
 112. United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden II), 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
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U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.113 
Between the two bombings, the death toll reached over 220.114 Two 
years later, fifteen defendants led by Osama Bin Laden were facing 
trial after having been indicted on 267 criminal offenses, including 
murder, maiming, and various conspiracy charges.115 Importantly, 
one of the defendants, known as Wadih El-Hage, was a U.S. 
citizen.116 
Though a U.S. citizen, El-Hage lived in Kenya from 1994 to 
1997.117 During the time he was living in Nairobi, American officials 
became aware of his ties to al-Qaeda.118 In fact, from August 1996 to 
August 1997, U.S. officials monitored five telephone lines in Kenya 
that were alleged to have been used by al-Qaeda operatives.119 One 
of these lines was located in a building in which El-Hage lived, and 
another was a cell-phone used by several parties, including El-
Hage.120 Significantly, Attorney General Janet Reno had authorized 
specific targeting of El-Hage, but did not do so until April 4, 
1997.121 Thus, there was no formal authorization for the searches 
conducted from August 1996 to April 4, 1997. On August 21, 
1997, presumably based on information collected from all of these 
intercepts, U.S. officials, in cooperation with Kenyan authorities, 
conducted a physical search of El-Hage’s home in Nairobi.122 
Though they still had no U.S. warrant, American officials did present 
El-Hage’s wife with a document subsequently “identified as a 
Kenyan warrant authorizing a search for ‘stolen property.’”123 
Notably, however, U.S. officials later indicated that they placed no 
 
 113. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 
306–07 (2006). 
 114. Id. at 308. 
 115. Id. 
 116. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008). For more information 
about Wadih El-Hage, see Oriana Zill, A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist, 
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage. 
html. 
 117. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 159. 
 122. Id. at 160. 
 123. Id. (quoting Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269). 
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legal authority in the Kenyan warrant.124 Given the classified nature 
of the case against El-Hage, it is difficult to know the nature of the 
evidence collected against him since, even at trial, it underwent in 
camera review. It is important to emphasize, however, that at least 
insofar as court records indicate, there were no further searches 
conducted against El-Hage until after the bombings, and he does 
not appear to have been detained at any point during that time. After 
the bombings in August of 1998, El-Hage returned to the United 
States and was subpoenaed to testify about al-Qaeda to a federal 
grand jury investigating the attacks.125 Moreover, during August and 
September of 1998, El-Hage’s home in Arlington, Texas was 
surveilled pursuant to a FISA order.126 Eventually, El-Hage was 
arrested and charged for his participation in the embassy 
bombings.127 The charges against El-Hage in particular included six 
conspiracies to kill U.S. citizens and destroy U.S. property abroad, 
twenty counts of perjury, and three counts of giving false 
statements.128 
B. District Court Disposition 
In defense, El-Hage filed a motion in district court to suppress 
evidence seized in the warrantless searches carried out against him by 
U.S. officials. Specifically, El-Hage’s motion to suppress focused on 
evidence seized from (1) the physical search of his Nairobi residence, 
(2) the electronic surveillance of the telephone lines he used in 
Kenya, and (3) the electronic surveillance, carried out pursuant to a 
FISA order, of his home in Texas.129 As grounds for suppression, El-
Hage asserted that the searches violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights because they were conducted without a warrant, or 
alternatively, because they were unreasonable.130 On December 5, 
 
 124. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 125. United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden I), 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 126. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 268 n.2. 
 127. Id. 
 128. United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 129. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Before the district court ruled on the motion 
to suppress as related to the Texas FISA search, El-Hage withdrew that motion. In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 
552 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 130. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
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2000, the district court issued an opinion denying both El-Hage’s 
request for an evidentiary hearing and his suppression motion.131 
1. Evidentiary hearing 
Instead, based on the government’s assertion that a proceeding 
in open court would jeopardize continuing investigations into al-
Qaeda, the court assessed the evidence against El-Hage in an in 
camera, ex parte review.132 Though the Supreme Court has affirmed 
the legality of such reviews,133 as noted by the district court in this 
case, several courts have also cautioned against their overuse.134 
Given the unique facts of the conspiracy at issue in this case, 
however, the court was persuaded that an in camera, ex parte review 
was appropriate to preserve the integrity of the government’s 
ongoing investigation.135 This finding was supported, in the court’s 
estimation, by the fact that El-Hage’s motion predominately 
centered on legal rather than factual questions, so the benefits 
associated with an adversarial proceeding were less critical.136 While it 
is hard to argue with the court’s decision in light of the 
circumstances of the case, it bears emphasizing that a defendant in a 
case like this will almost always face a high hurdle in overcoming the 
government’s arguments. Given the classified nature of much of the 
evidence, and the serious threats that such defendants are alleged to 
pose, it is hard to imagine them commonly prevailing in an effort to 
receive an evidentiary hearing.  
2. Application of the Fourth Amendment overseas 
After deciding on an in camera, ex parte review of the evidence, 
the court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment applied at all to 
overseas searches.137 In exploring this issue, the court noted that 
“[t]he Government seems to concede the general applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to American citizens abroad, but asserts that the 
 
 131. Id. at 286–88.  
 132. Id. at 286–87. 
 133. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317–18 (1969). 
 134. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (citing United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 
593, 607 n.78 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1983)). 
 135. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 287. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 270–71. 
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particular searches contested in this case (which were conducted 
overseas to collect foreign intelligence) call for a more limited 
application of the Amendment.”138 Thus, it is significant that the 
government never argued that there was generally no warrant 
requirement for overseas searches of U.S. citizens; instead, it argued 
a foreign intelligence exception applied. In its own analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment’s overseas applicability, the district court 
asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid appeared to 
suggest that the Amendment did apply to U.S. citizens abroad.139 
Consequently, while explicitly observing that “the extent of the 
Fourth Amendment protection, in particular the applicability of the 
warrant Clause, is unclear,” the court determined that at least some 
of the safeguards of the Amendment applied in this case.140 
3. The foreign intelligence exception 
Consequently, the real issue at the district court level was 
whether there was an exception to the Fourth Amendment that 
applied to the searches in this case. At the outset of this analysis, the 
court dismissed any doubt that might have existed about the 
possibility that the search was a joint venture between U.S. and 
Kenyan authorities.141 Addressing this issue was necessary in light of 
the “warrant” that Kenyan authorities provided to El-Hage’s wife 
during the physical search of their Nairobi property.142 The court, 
however, rejected the idea that the search was a joint venture—which 
might arguably have provided El-Hage with more protection—based 
on the government’s assertion that “American authorities . . . did 
not rely upon the Kenyan warrant as legal authority for the 
search.”143 
With that matter settled, the court directed its attention to the 
government’s argument that a foreign intelligence exception applied 
 
 138. Id. at 270. 
 139. Id. at 270–71. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 271. 
 142. Id. at 271 n.6. 
 143. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 4, No. 1:98CR01023). The assertion that a 
joint venture search might provide more protection is based on the fact that courts occasionally 
have viewed such searches skeptically, construing them as attempts by U.S. officials to “short-
circuit” Fourth Amendment rights. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. Had the 
court found a joint venture search, it is possible (though by no means necessary) that the court 
could have used such reasoning to grant the motion to suppress. 
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in this case to the warrant requirement. In examining this claim, the 
district court highlighted that the Supreme Court had recognized 
the issue in Keith, but had not resolved it.144 While acknowledging 
that other district and circuit courts had squarely addressed the issue 
of a domestic intelligence exception, the district court professed that 
“[n]o court has considered the contours of such an exception when 
the searches at issue targeted an American citizen overseas.”145 
Significantly, the court also noted that since those cases had not 
applied to U.S. citizens abroad, and because they were adjudicated 
before FISA’s enactment, even if those situations were to arise again 
they would currently be governed by FISA anyway.146 In other 
words, the court determined there was a complete dearth of 
precedential authority, and that it was in the awkward situation of 
having to decide a case when subsequent statutes had changed the 
legal landscape. As a result, the court turned instead to an analysis of 
the factors underlying the foreign intelligence exception to 
determine if its application was appropriate in this case. 
According to the court, the executive’s authority over foreign 
affairs constituted a “determinative basis” for applying the foreign 
intelligence exception. Specifically, the court referenced the case of 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright, in which the Supreme Court had 
accepted the “plenary and exclusive power of the President as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”147 As applied to the particular facts in the present case, the 
court noted that it was also “generally recognized that this authority 
includes power over foreign intelligence collection.”148 That said, the 
court acknowledged that even in Curtiss-Wright itself, it was 
apparent that the president’s foreign affairs authority had to yield to 
other express restraints of the Constitution.149 Despite this apparent 
nod to moderation, the court asserted that the executive had been 
engaging in warrantless foreign intelligence searches for decades.150 
 
 144. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 271. 
 145. Id. at 272. 
 146. Id. at 272 n.8; see supra note 78 (discussing subsequent changes to FISA that have 
partially filled this gap in the law). 
 147. Id. at 272 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
 148. Id. (referring to Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875); Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988)). 
 149. Id. at 273. 
 150. Id. 
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While “Congress ha[d] legislated with respect to domestic incidents 
of foreign intelligence collection . . . [it] ha[d] not addressed the 
issue of foreign intelligence collection which occur[ed] abroad.”151 
Though the court stated that this supposed congressional silence was 
not dispositive, it clearly played a significant role in the ultimate 
outcome of the case. 
Beyond the president’s foreign affairs power, the court felt that 
the costs associated with imposing the warrant requirement also 
called for application of the foreign intelligence exception. According 
to the court, the burdens of obtaining a warrant were apparently 
disproportionate to the benefits to be gained by doing so.152 Further, 
the court accepted the argument that the “judicial branch is ill-suited 
to the task of overseeing foreign intelligence collection.”153 This 
contention had been advanced by the government, on the basis that 
a court would be unable to ascertain the full impact of its decisions 
upon foreign policy.154 Moreover, the court found persuasive that “a 
procedure requiring notification to [a hostile] government could be 
self-defeating.”155 Additionally, the court posited that requiring 
judicial review prior to a search in foreign intelligence cases would 
create unbearable delay for the executive.156 Though an exigent 
circumstance exception already existed for such circumstances in 
domestic cases, the court was unconvinced “that the exigent 
circumstances doctrine provide[d] enough protection for the 
interests at stake.”157 Finally, the court accepted the government’s 
argument that involving the judiciary in the pre-approval process 
would increase the possibility of security breaches.158 The court was 
careful, however, in its attempt not to impugn the judiciary, stating 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (“[S]everal cases direct that when the imposition of a warrant requirement 
proves to be a disproportionate . . . burden on the Executive, a warrant should not be 
required.” (emphasis added)). 
 153. Id. at 274. While the court proceeded to say that the incompetence of the judiciary 
related to domestic intelligence had been somewhat undercut by Keith, it found the argument 
persuasive as related to foreign intelligence. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. Unfortunately, the court failed to explain why it believed such notification would 
be required. 
 156. Id. at 275. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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that the “mere perception that inadvertent disclosure is more likely is 
sufficient to obstruct the intelligence collection imperative.”159 
Lastly, the foreign intelligence exception was necessary, 
according to the court, because there was, at that time, no procedure 
by which U.S. officials could obtain a warrant to conduct an overseas 
search.160 In fact, the court noted that there was not even then 
statutory authority for searches conducted abroad for standard law 
enforcement purposes.161 El-Hage argued on this point that if the 
government was going to conduct extraterritorial searches, it must 
find a way to do so constitutionally. In responding, the court noted 
that the judiciary may have inherent authority of its own to effect the 
dictates of the Fourth Amendment.162 In other words, regardless of 
what statutory power may or may not exist, if a warrant was 
required, the judiciary had authority to issue it. While briefly 
acknowledging this possibility, however, the court ultimately 
determined that acquiring a warrant for the searches at issue in this 
case “would certainly have been impracticable given the absence of 
any statutory provisions empowering a magistrate to issue a 
warrant.”163 
Given the aforementioned justifications for the foreign 
intelligence exception, the court generally accepted the merits of the 
foreign intelligence exception and formally adopted it. In an attempt 
to remain true to the Fourth Amendment, however, the court was 
careful to explain how narrowly it had tailored the exception. As 
adopted, it included “only those overseas searches, authorized by the 
President (or his delegate, the Attorney General), which are 
conducted primarily for foreign intelligence purposes and which 
target foreign powers or their agents.”164 
 
 159. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent, No. 1:98CR01023).  
 160. Id. at 275–76. In cases of domestic or international terrorism, current criminal 
procedure rules allow magistrates to issue warrants outside of their assigned districts if any 
related activity has occurred within their districts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3). 
 161. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 275 n.13. 
 162. Id. at 276–77. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 277 (citing United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915–17 (4th Cir. 1980)). 
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4. Application of the foreign intelligence exception to searches conducted 
against El-Hage 
After formally adopting the foreign intelligence exception as a 
general principle, the court next had to decide if it applied to this 
specific case. Briefly, in order to apply the exception to this case, the 
court determined that the government had to show that El-Hage 
was an agent of foreign power, that the searches were conducted 
primarily for foreign intelligence collection rather than criminal 
investigation, and that the president or attorney general had 
authorized the searches. 
In addressing these issues, the court first stated that it was clear 
from its review of the evidence that there was probable cause to 
suspect that El-Hage was an al-Qaeda operative.165 As such, he 
qualified as an agent of a foreign power, as defined by Congress.166 
Next, in assessing whether the search was primarily conducted for 
intelligence collection or a criminal investigation, the court said that 
although criminal evidence was certainly acquired from the searches, 
they had primarily been conducted as foreign intelligence efforts.167 
This finding was based on numerous factors, including the fact that 
the FBI was apparently not the lead agency when the searches were 
carried out.168 The most challenging factor in applying the exception 
became the need for the searches to have been authorized by the 
executive. As noted above, Attorney General Janet Reno had 
authorized U.S. officials to target El-Hage on April 4, 1997.169 The 
problem was that the searches against telephone lines he used had 
commenced well before that—specifically, in August of 1996. After a 
lengthy analysis, the court addressed this temporal gap by admitting 
the evidence based in large part on the good faith exception 
articulated in United States v. Leon.170 Indeed, the court found that 
“the officials who conducted the electronic surveillance operated 
under an actual and reasonable belief that Attorney General approval 
was not required prior to April 4, 1997, when El-Hage was 
 
 165. Id. at 277–78. 
 166. Id. at 278 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)–(b) (2008)). 
 167. Id. at 278–79. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 279.  
 170. Id. at 283–84 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). 
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specifically identified . . . as a target . . . .”171 Accordingly, 
suppressing the seized evidence would not, in the court’s estimation, 
have fulfilled the exclusionary rule’s underlying goal of deterrence. 
Based on each of these findings, the court was persuaded that 
applying the foreign intelligence exception was appropriate in this 
case. Consequently, the court held that El-Hage’s Fourth 
Amendment rights had not been violated, even though no warrant 
had been obtained for the search of his home in Nairobi.172 In 
reaching this conclusion, it is again important to highlight that the 
district court did not find that the warrant requirement never applies 
to U.S. citizens abroad. Instead, its holding was limited to foreign 
intelligence collection operations. 
5. Reasonableness 
Finally, while the reasonableness requirement is not the primary 
focus of this Note, it should be noted that the court closely 
examined the searches at issue in this case to determine whether they 
had been conducted in a reasonable manner.173 This is important 
because, had the court found the searches unreasonable, it could 
simply have disposed of the case on those grounds. Paramount to the 
reasonableness analysis was a review of the techniques employed by 
the government to minimize the privacy invasion while collecting 
information from El-Hage’s telephone conversations.174 This scrutiny 
was necessitated based on El-Hage’s argument that the searches were 
unlimited and lacked specificity, therefore rendering them 
unreasonable.175 Given the global and diffuse nature of the 
conspiracy, however, the court granted the government more leeway 
regarding the procedures it had used during the operation. Beyond 
the geographic hurdles, this was also necessary, the court said, 
because the alleged conspirators spoke a foreign language, used 
 
 171. Id. at 284. 
 172. Id. at 285. 
 173. Of course, as noted above, given the fact that the court rejected the warrant 
requirement, there is a strong argument that the searches were therefore inherently 
unreasonable. Furthermore, even if one were to accept that the searches were reasonable 
without the warrant, there are serious questions about whether the minimization efforts really 
were sufficient, and whether the length of the searches (over one year) made them at least 
“less” reasonable.  
 174. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 285–86. 
 175. Id. at 285. 
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communal phones, and could likely have used code language to 
discuss their planning activities.176 With this extra latitude, the court 
had little trouble finding that the searches had been conducted in a 
reasonable manner.177 
Given the government’s success in proving that the searches were 
reasonable, and in light of the court’s application of the foreign 
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, the court 
confidently rejected El-Hage’s motion to suppress. It did so, 
however, in a very narrowly tailored fashion, limiting the exception 
to foreign intelligence searches authorized by the President or 
Attorney General. In fact, as noted above, this exception was so 
narrowly tailored that it was essentially swallowed up by the 
subsequent FISA Amendments Act of 2008.178 Had the Second 
Circuit simply adopted the findings of the district court, this case 
would not be so troubling. Instead, however, the Second Circuit 
took a far more sweeping approach in addressing the Terrorist 
Bombings case on appeal. 
C. Second Circuit Disposition  
Ultimately, El-Hage’s case went to trial and a jury convicted him 
of the charges.179 Thereafter, he appealed, challenging, among other 
things, the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the 
evidence seized during the Kenyan searches, as well as the resolution 
of that motion without an evidentiary hearing.180 Significantly, El-
Hage argued that the foreign intelligence exception was inapplicable 
to the searches against him because they had been conducted as part 
of a criminal investigation rather than as an intelligence collection 
operation.181 He also continued to assert that the searches themselves 
were not conducted in a reasonable manner because they were 
overbroad.182 
 
 176. Id. at 286. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra note 78. 
 179. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 101–02 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 180. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008). As indicated above, El-
Hage withdrew his motion related to the FISA search of his Texas property. The propriety of 
that search, therefore, was not an issue before the Second Circuit. See supra note 129. 
 181. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 164.  
 182. Id. at 174.  
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010 3:55 PM 
719 Bombed Away 
 751 
1. Evidentiary hearing 
As a preliminary matter, the court rejected El-Hage’s contention 
that he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion to suppress.183 In doing so, it reasserted the district court’s 
rationale that the ongoing nature of the investigation of al-Qaeda 
required an in camera review. Specifically, while acknowledging El-
Hage’s interest in reviewing the evidence against him, and his need 
to challenge the assertions of the government, the court felt that 
“the imperatives of national security and the capacity of in camera 
procedures to adequately safeguard El-Hage’s Fourth Amendment 
rights weighed against holding an evidentiary hearing” under the 
circumstances of the case.184  
2. Reasonableness 
Regarding the reasonableness of the searches, the court likewise 
held that the “searches’ intrusion on El-Hage’s privacy was 
outweighed by the government’s manifest need to monitor his 
activities as an operative of al-Qaeda because of the extreme threat 
al-Qaeda presented . . . to national security.”185 Moreover, while the 
court acknowledged that “El-Hage suffered, while abroad, a 
significant invasion of privacy,” it also felt that the government was 
justified under the circumstances.186 In other words, though the 
searches may have been overbroad in other contexts, they were 
appropriate in a case such as this given: (1) the complex and 
decentralized nature of al-Qaeda, (2) the fact that the value of 
intelligence information is not always immediately apparent, (3) the 
tendency for conspirators to speak in code, and (4) the difficulties 
associated with foreign language intercepts.187 Because these factors 
presumably will be present in most international terrorism 
investigations, and given the potential gravity of the threat posed by 
 
 183. Id. at 165.  
 184. Id. at 166 (internal citation and quotation omitted).  
 185. Id. at 172–73. Significantly, given the court’s rejection of the warrant requirement, 
this balancing test appears to be the new contour of Fourth Amendment rights in the Second 
Circuit for searches conducted against U.S. citizens abroad. Though not revolutionary (see 
supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text), such a balancing test related to a constitutional 
right is disturbing since the balancing will always occur ex post. Thus, the limits of one’s rights 
will not be apparent until after a search has already been carried out. 
 186. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 175. 
 187. Id. at 175–76. 
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such groups, one is left with the impression that a search would have 
to be blatantly unreasonable in order to be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, because the court determined 
that the searches were reasonable, the outcome of this case 
necessarily hinged on whether the searches violated the Fourth 
Amendment for being conducted without a warrant. 
3. The foreign intelligence exception 
On this issue, it is important to begin with the fact that the 
Second Circuit declined to adopt the foreign intelligence exception 
as applied to this case.188 In apparent recognition of the difficult 
issues raised by El-Hage—namely, the complexities of parsing 
criminal investigations from intelligence collection operations—the 
court found application of the exception “inapt” here.189 Indeed, 
because adopting the exception would have required “an inquiry 
into whether the ‘primary purpose’ of the search [was] foreign 
intelligence collection” as opposed to a criminal investigation, the 
court altogether abandoned any effort to apply the exception in this 
case.190 Such a decision was actually unsurprising given developments 
in the law in the intervening years between the disposition of this 
case at the district and circuit court levels. More directly, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review had stated in a 2002 case 
that the so-called “primary purpose” test—that is, the determination 
of whether the primary purpose of a search was for criminal or 
intelligence purposes—rested on a false assumption that “once the 
government moves to criminal prosecution, its ‘foreign policy 
concerns’ recede . . . .”191 Because there was no easy way to discern 
the line between these two types of investigations, the Second 
Circuit simply refused to apply the exception in Terrorist Bombings.  
 
 188. Id. at 171–72. 
 189. Id. at 172. 
 190. Id. (citation omitted).  
 191. Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
2002)). Readers familiar with FISA and its impact on the relationship between the Department 
of Justice and the Intelligence Community will recognize this as a rudimentary explanation of 
what has sometimes been termed “the FISA Wall” or, more simply, “the Wall.” After 9/11, 
“the Wall” received much attention, and much blame, for perceived failures in information 
sharing between the FBI and the Intelligence Community. For more information, see NAT’L 
COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT, 78–80 (2004) and Cedric Logan, Note, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 209 (2009). 
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4. Application of the Fourth Amendment overseas 
With the foreign intelligence exception therefore deemed 
inapplicable, the Second Circuit continued its analysis, as the district 
court had done, with an inquiry into whether the Fourth 
Amendment even applied at all to U.S. citizens located overseas.192 
Relying on Reid, as well as cases from its own circuit, the court 
asserted that the Bill of Rights generally does apply extraterritorially 
to protect U.S. citizens against illegal conduct of U.S. authorities.193 
Nonetheless, the court noted that no case had precisely addressed 
whether the warrant requirement specifically applied under the 
circumstances of this case.194 Having abandoned the relatively narrow 
foreign intelligence exception applied by the district court, the 
Second Circuit issued a sweeping opinion that the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement “does not govern searches 
conducted abroad by U.S. agents,” and that “such searches of U.S. 
citizens need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of 
reasonableness.”195 This extensive holding was based on four factors 
the court felt weighed against the obligation to obtain a warrant; 
namely, (1) the absence of precedent mandating the requirement for 
a warrant in such circumstances, (2) the “inadvisability of 
conditioning our government’s surveillance on the practices of 
foreign states, (3) a U.S. warrant’s lack of authority overseas, and (4) 
the absence of a mechanism for obtaining a U.S. warrant.”196 Each of 
these factors will be examined in turn. 
First, the court contended that there was no precedent 
suggesting that U.S. officials are required to obtain a warrant to 
conduct searches abroad.197 In making this assertion, the court relied 
on language from Verdugo-Urquidez, wherein the Supreme Court 
had held, as explained above, that a warrant was not required for a 
search by U.S. officials against aliens abroad.198 In dicta from that 
case, however, the Second Circuit noted that the Court had also said 
 
 192. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 167.  
 193. Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957); Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 
1179, 1189 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280–81 (2d Cir. 
1974)). 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 172.  
 197. Id. at 169.  
 198. Id.  
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that “‘the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment . . . 
suggests that its purpose was to restrict searches and seizures which 
might be conducted by the United States in domestic matters.’”199 
Moreover, the court maintained that the warrant requirement’s 
language had been imbued with a different meaning when drafted 
than it has in modern times.200 Specifically, citing language from the 
dissent in Payton v. New York, the court suggested that the Fourth 
Amendment, as originally constituted, had been drafted not to 
protect criminal suspects, but to strengthen the authority of law 
enforcement agents.201 Indeed, according to Justice White’s Payton 
dissent, the warrant requirement had not originally been offered to 
restrict law enforcement officials, but rather to grant them 
“delegated powers of a superior officer such as a justice of the 
peace.”202  
In a footnote after this discussion, the court noted that the 
interest generally served in having a neutral and detached magistrate 
make a probable cause determination to ensure that issuing a warrant 
would be appropriate.203 Nevertheless, the court felt those interests 
were lessened in cases like this because judicial officials in the United 
States would have difficulty determining whether an overseas search 
was in fact reasonable, and because the executive’s power over 
foreign affairs “ought to be respected in these circumstances.”204 
Accordingly, and in light of the additional findings above, the court 
determined that nothing in the historical record indicated that a 
warrant was required for foreign searches, whether against a U.S. 
citizen or not.205 
As a second factor weighing against the warrant requirement for 
overseas searches, the court asserted that there was nothing to 
suggest that U.S officials would be required to “obtain warrants 
from foreign magistrates before conducting searches overseas or, 
indeed, to suppose that all other states have search and investigation 
 
 199. Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)). 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 169–70 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 604–14 (1980) (White, 
J., dissenting)).  
 202. Payton, 445 U.S. at 607–08 (White, J., dissenting). 
 203. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 170 n.7.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 169–70. 
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rules akin to our own.”206 Relying again on dicta from Verdugo-
Urquidez, the court declared that “the Constitution does not 
condition our government’s investigative powers on the practices of 
foreign legal regimes.”207 Perhaps owing to the nonsensicality of this 
argument, there was only one paragraph related to this issue in the 
court’s opinion, so the contours of this factor are not entirely clear. 
The tenor seems to indicate, however, that the court was concerned 
that imposing the warrant requirement would mandate that U.S. 
officials who wished to conduct an overseas search obtain a warrant 
from the overseas judiciary (assuming there was one) rather than 
from a U.S. magistrate. As the court understandably did not wish for 
this result, its analysis led it to the conclusion that a warrant was not 
necessary. 
In a related vein, the court felt that even if a U.S. magistrate 
were to issue a warrant for a search against a U.S. citizen abroad, 
that warrant would have little, if any, legal authority overseas.208 As 
support for this argument, the court noted the obvious fact that 
nations have their own sovereignty and that they therefore would 
not be constrained in any way to cooperate with a U.S. search 
warrant. In determining that such a warrant would be a “nullity,” 
the court thus stated that “[a] warrant issued by a U.S. court would 
neither empower a U.S. agent to conduct a search nor would it 
necessarily compel the intended target to comply.”209 Given the 
“dead-letter” nature of such a warrant under these parameters, the 
court clearly felt no compunction in jettisoning the warrant 
requirement from the Fourth Amendment for overseas searches 
against U.S. citizens.  
Finally, in what was perhaps the soundest prong of its analysis, 
the Second Circuit felt that the warrant requirement must not apply 
to overseas searches, because there was simply no procedure in place 
whereby U.S. officials could obtain a warrant to conduct an overseas 
search against a U.S. citizen.210 Though the district court had at least 
 
 206. Id. at 170.  
 207. Id. at 171. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. As noted above, this gap in the law has been partially filled in since the disposition of 
this case. Federal criminal procedure rules have changed and FISA amendments now allow the 
issuance of FISA orders for foreign intelligence collection. The parameters of the rule and Act, 
however, still appear to leave a gap as to a mechanism to obtain warrants for overseas searches 
in strictly criminal investigations. 
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entertained the possibility of inherent judicial authority to issue such 
warrants, the Second Circuit decided instead that it “need not 
resolve that issue” in the present case.211 
IV. ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS 
Despite the court’s apparent confidence to the contrary, it is 
extremely difficult to reconcile the holding in Terrorist Bombings—
namely, that the warrant requirement does not apply to searches 
conducted by U.S. officials against U.S. citizens abroad—with the 
prior trajectory of case law and congressional action pertaining to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This section takes up an analysis 
of the Second Circuit’s opinion and explains why the decision is so 
troubling, and how it places U.S. citizens abroad at risk of 
inappropriate privacy invasions. As highlighted above, the court 
rested its holding on four factors; namely, (1) the absence of 
precedent requiring a warrant for overseas searches, (2) the 
inadvisability of conditioning our own government’s surveillance on 
the practices of foreign states, (3) a U.S. warrant’s lack of authority 
overseas, and (4) the absence of a mechanism for obtaining a U.S. 
warrant.  
A. The Second Circuit’s Factors Making the Warrant         
Requirement Inapplicable  
1. Absence of precedent mandating the requirement for a warrant 
As its first factor explaining why the warrant requirement was 
inapplicable to overseas U.S. citizens, the Second Circuit noted an 
apparent dearth in precedent requiring a warrant in such 
circumstances. While there indeed has been no case expressly 
establishing that precise principle, all case law and congressional 
action that does exist certainly supports such a notion. Katz 
established, for instance, that warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable.212 Moreover, as outlined above, after Katz, Keith, and 
the passage of FISA, there is no search in the United States itself that 
could generally be conducted without a warrant.213 Given Katz’s 
further declaration that the Fourth Amendment applies to people 
 
 211. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 171. 
 212. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted).  
 213. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010 3:55 PM 
719 Bombed Away 
 757 
rather than places, it is hard to resolve the Second Circuit’s 
unwillingness to apply the warrant requirement to a U.S. citizen 
overseas, when it would surely be required if that same person were 
in the United States. In fact, as mentioned above, though the 
government had argued for application of the foreign intelligence 
exception, even it did not make the argument in Terrorist Bombings 
that the warrant requirement was generally inapplicable to searches 
against U.S. citizens abroad. 
Even for searches conducted abroad, the court’s decision is on 
shaky ground. Specifically, while case law has established that 
evidence seized by foreign officials in a search against a U.S. citizen is 
admissible even if the search violates the Fourth Amendment, this 
latitude has not been extended to searches by U.S. officials. This 
makes imminent sense, given the fact that the rationale behind such 
a rule is that U.S. officials cannot expect foreign authorities to 
comply with U.S. laws. On the other hand, even if the search is the 
result of a cooperative joint venture between U.S. and foreign 
authorities, the fact that U.S. officials participate in any meaningful 
way does implicate the Fourth Amendment. Admittedly, to this 
point, these cases have only required compliance with the 
reasonableness aspect of the Amendment, but as this Note has 
attempted to explain, there are strong arguments against the notion 
that the reasonableness requirement can really be separated from the 
warrant requirement.214 
The strongest possible support for the Second Circuit’s position 
probably rests in Verdugo-Urquidez, but even reliance on that case 
would be misplaced. Verdugo-Urquidez addressed searches related to 
nonresident aliens in foreign countries, and as emphasized above, the 
Court was careful to establish that the case hinged on the fact that 
the Fourth Amendment was never intended to “restrain the actions 
of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United 
States territory.”215 While it might be argued that the case could 
nevertheless logically be extended even to U.S. citizens, such a 
position would require ignorance of the rationale offered by the 
Verdugo-Urquidez Court to explain the holding. Specifically, though 
nonresident aliens perhaps have indeed not established “sufficient 
connection” with the United States to be considered part of the U.S. 
 
 214. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 215. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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community, certainly U.S. citizens have.216 Given the Verdugo-
Urquidez Court’s reliance on social compact ideas, the fact that U.S. 
citizens have given up some rights in order to be a part of the 
community should entitle them to partake in some of the benefits 
thereof. As specifically applied to the details of this case, for instance, 
the fact that U.S. citizens have no right to resist valid search warrants 
should entitle them to having one presented in the first place.  
While the Second Circuit also implied in a footnote to this 
section that making probable cause determinations for the issuance 
of overseas intelligence-related warrants is outside the competence of 
the judiciary,217 such a proposition has been flatly rejected by the 
Supreme Court. Though the primary focus in Keith had been on 
domestic national security issues, the Court nevertheless generally 
addressed the government’s contention that political and national 
security issues were beyond the command of the judiciary.218 
Pointedly, the Court stated that judges “regularly deal with the most 
difficult issues of our society,” and that there was “no reason to 
believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending 
of the issues involved . . . .”219 Moreover, the Second Circuit’s 
opinion itself bears this out. Though the court expressed that the 
warrant requirement should be abandoned because of a concern that 
“a domestic judicial officer’s ability to determine the reasonableness 
of a search is diminished where the search occurs on foreign soil,”220 
the court thereafter turned to an ex post analysis of the very issue—
that is, whether the search at issue had been conducted reasonably. If 
the judiciary can be trusted to make such a determination ex post, it 
is not entirely clear why they cannot be given the same trust to 
conduct such a review ex ante. The most likely explanation for the 
Second Circuit’s position on this matter is that it evidently accepted 
the government’s argument that even the perception of a potential 
security breach would hinder like investigations. The trouble with 
this argument is that, taken to its extreme, it would require the 
judiciary to be completely excised from the process. For example, in 
 
 216. If U.S. citizens have not established enough of a connection, one would be hard 
pressed to explain who has. 
 217. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 218. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 319–20 (1972). 
 219. Id. at 320. 
 220. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 170 n.7. 
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denying El-Hage’s evidentiary hearing, the court said that the 
ongoing investigation into al-Qaeda required that the evidentiary 
review be conducted out of the eye of the public, in an in camera, ex 
parte manner. But if the judiciary cannot be trusted not to breach 
security at the warrant issuance stage, surely its involvement at the 
evidentiary hearing stage has no less potential for harm when 
investigations continue in the midst of prosecutions. 
The fact is that the judiciary abdicates its responsibility to act as a 
neutral and detached observer when it refuses to carry out its role as 
intermediary between the executive and individual citizens. While 
the judiciary indeed may not be as attuned to foreign affairs as the 
executive, the executive is not left completely at the mercy of a 
magistrate in this regard. Indeed, while, as noted above, a suspect 
often will not be represented when evidentiary reviews are made, the 
government—and more precisely, the executive—will be. Thus, 
concern over judicial ignorance ultimately returns to the fact that the 
executive must fulfill its obligation to persuade the judiciary that 
cause exists to perform a constitutional search. 
2. Inadvisability of conditioning government surveillance on the 
practices of foreign states 
Insofar as the record indicates, there was no suggestion by either 
of the Terrorist Bombings parties that the warrant requirement 
dictates that U.S. officials obtain a search warrant from an overseas 
magistrate (or some equivalent thereof) in order to conduct a valid 
search against an overseas U.S. citizen. Nevertheless, the court 
apparently felt compelled to proclaim that “nothing in the history of 
foreign relations of the United States would require U.S. officials 
[to] obtain warrants from foreign magistrates before conducting 
searches overseas or, indeed, to suppose that all other states have 
search and investigation rules akin to our own.”221 It seems that this 
was a point on which all parties could have agreed because the issue 
was not that a warrant should be required in order to increase the 
legitimacy of the search from the perspective of a foreign 
government, but rather that obtaining a warrant is required to satisfy 
the U.S. Constitution. The Second Circuit seemed to have realized 
this distinction since it left in place the requirement that overseas 
searches meet the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment; 
 
 221. Id. at 170.  
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so it is unclear why it believed that the issuance of a warrant would 
be any different. The only insight comes from the court’s reliance on 
language from Verdugo-Urquidez, wherein the Supreme Court had 
alluded to the fact that “the Constitution does not condition our 
government’s investigative powers on the practices of foreign legal 
regimes . . . .”222 While true, this language misses the point, explored 
in more depth in section three below, that the Constitution does—
or at least should—regulate the conduct of our own government. 
Perhaps an issue tangentially related to this point was at work in 
the court’s analysis of this factor. Namely, though the Second Circuit 
did not explore it in great detail, it did note the district court’s 
observation that requiring a warrant for overseas intelligence-related 
searches could inordinately delay executive action to carry out such 
searches. Such a delay in the area of national security could 
admittedly have grave consequences. That said, there is no legitimate 
explanation offered by either court as to why such a scenario would 
not fall squarely within the already well-established bounds of the 
exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.223 In 
contrast to throwing the entire warrant requirement out the window, 
applying the exigent circumstance doctrine to overseas searches 
conducted for intelligence purposes would have been more in line 
with established Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
3. U.S. warrant’s lack of authority overseas 
On a point related to the last factor, the court’s assertion that a 
U.S. warrant would lack any legal authority overseas also misses the 
mark. With this contention, just as with the last, the court seems to 
center its attention on the impact of a warrant upon the foreign 
power exercising jurisdiction over the area searched. The significance 
of a warrant for an overseas search, however, does not lie in the 
warrant’s influence upon foreign officials, but rather in the legitimacy 
it instills on the search, any seized evidence, and the U.S. judicial 
 
 222. Id. at 171. 
 223. The most that is said about this issue is the district court’s assertion that, although 
El-Hage apparently attempted to make this point, the court was “not persuaded that the 
exigent circumstances doctrine provides enough protection for the interests at stake.” United 
States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden II), 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Further, 
neither court acknowledged the fact that the electronic surveillance was conducted for 
approximately a year, leading one to question the legitimacy of the need for the exigent 
circumstances exception in this case anyway. 
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process itself. Indeed, foreign power or not, arguably the only way to 
comport with the very principles underlying the Fourth Amendment 
would be to obtain a warrant under such circumstances. 
As noted above, the purpose of the warrant requirement is not to 
satisfy foreign officials, but to ensure that an overzealous executive 
does not trample the rights of those entitled to constitutional 
protection. Repeatedly, in Johnson, Katz, Keith, and Ehrlichman, for 
example, courts have rejected the notion that the executive is 
competent to serve as the neutral and detached official necessary to 
authorize a valid search. Congress apparently thought the same, 
given its language in FISA requiring the executive to obtain FISC 
approval for intelligence-related searches against U.S. persons. 
Though the executive may see the warrant requirement as a hurdle, 
or as some sort of a condemnation of its integrity, its point is not to 
impugn. Instead, the requirement for judicial interposition 
recognizes the fact that the American people do not expect, or 
indeed even wish for, the executive to be neutral. As Justice Douglas 
stated in Katz, the duty of the executive is to “vigorously investigate 
and prevent breaches of [the law] and prosecute those who violate” 
it.224 On the other hand, part of the beauty of our system is that it 
establishes a process whereby this vigor is tempered by the judiciary 
in order to ensure protection of constitutional liberties. 
The issue, in short, is not the legitimacy that foreign officials vest 
in a U.S. warrant, it is rather the legitimacy that defendants facing 
charges in U.S. courts can confer in it. Obviously, as the Second 
Circuit rightly noted, a U.S. warrant may have no authority 
overseas—but that is beside the point. The real concern is the 
influence it carries within the United States, and the questions that 
arise about the legitimacy of a search conducted without a warrant. 
Although the executive might suggest that searches for national 
security purposes are unique, such a contention arguably strengthens 
rather than weakens the need for a judicial intermediary because of 
the otherwise plenary power the executive has regarding foreign 
affairs.  
 The Second Circuit had perhaps a stronger point, however, 
when it asserted that a U.S. warrant would not necessarily compel 
the intended target of a search to comply with its terms. This point 
can be addressed, though, in light of the acceptance of the Supreme 
 
 224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Court of certain social compact theories. More directly, the Court 
argued in Verdugo-Urquidez that a nonresident alien was not part of 
the U.S. “compact” because such a person has not given up any 
rights in order to obtain the benefits that flow from the 
Constitution. But where a person has, such an individual must 
recognize that with those benefits come certain prohibitions on 
one’s conduct. Thus, though the court seemed to ignore this fact, 
the truth is that a U.S. citizen would in fact be compelled to adhere 
to a search warrant simply by virtue of citizenship and by the fact 
that he has received the benefit of having a search warrant presented 
in the first place. In other words, receiving the benefits of the Fourth 
Amendment also requires that one adhere to the obligations 
associated with it.225  
4. Absence of mechanism for obtaining a U.S. warrant 
Although the Second Circuit chose not to resolve the issue of 
whether there was a mechanism for a U.S. magistrate to issue an 
overseas warrant, it stated that it was at least unclear whether such a 
procedure existed. Indeed, this factor was perhaps the most 
challenging aspect of the Terrorist Bombings case. As the district 
court had pointed out, at the time the case was originally prosecuted, 
there was no statutory provision authorizing the issuance of an 
overseas warrant for either criminal or intelligence-related 
investigations.226 But while the district court acknowledged that “the 
acquisition [of a warrant] would certainly have been impracticable,” 
it did not accept that it would have been impossible.227 
Actually, the government itself had even conceded the possibility 
that a court’s authority to issue warrants was not contingent upon 
Congress’s establishment of a statutory procedure to do so.228 
Without such a statutory scheme, however, the judiciary would have 
to rely upon its own inherent authority—whatever that might be—to 
carry out its constitutional obligation to issue warrants.229 The idea, 
though not exactly commonplace, was also not novel; El-Hage had 
 
 225. While some may argue that it cannot be assumed that a U.S. citizen abroad will 
consent to the search, this misses the point. The argument here is that, regardless of whether 
the individual consents, a warrant imbues the search with legitimacy. 
 226. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 276 n.13. 
 227. Id. at 276–77. 
 228. Id. at 277 n.16. 
 229. Id. 
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essentially made such an argument in his appeal, and the court itself 
outlined several cases that seemed to support such a possibility. For 
example, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., the Supreme 
Court acknowledged, without rejecting the practice, that Courts of 
Appeals had authorized warrants under “an inherent power . . . to 
issue search warrants under circumstances conforming to the Fourth 
Amendment.”230 And the circuits, indeed, had been far more 
straightforward about the issue. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, 
had established that “the power to issue a search warrant was 
historically, and is still today, an inherent (by which we mean simply 
a nonstatutory, or common law) power of a court of general 
jurisdiction.”231 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit also explicitly approved 
of the issuance of warrants without statutory authority in order to 
comport with the Fourth Amendment.232 Thus, it would not have 
been astounding for the court to determine that, despite the 
procedural oddities, the government had an obligation to pursue a 
warrant for the searches against El-Hage, regardless of whether or 
not a court ultimately granted one. Unmistakably this argument 
imputes the government with a degree of foresight, but given the 
rights at stake, it does not seem unreasonable to require such. 
B. A Better Way  
To be sure, there is no doubt that the Second Circuit was caught 
between a rock and a hard place with the Terrorist Bombings case, 
especially given the state of the law at the time of its underlying 
events. Perhaps the court felt it was faced with two equally 
unappealing choices: either uphold the Fourth Amendment and 
likely allow an alleged mass-murderer to go free, or dismiss the 
dictates of the Fourth Amendment and deem the warrant 
requirement inapplicable overseas. With the issue framed this way, 
maybe the court’s disposition of the case is less troubling. 
But there was a middle course. A better solution would have 
been for the Second Circuit to have simply affirmed the district 
court’s application of the foreign intelligence exception to the 
searches against El-Hage. Though this exception had subsequently 
 
 230. 434 U.S. 159, 169 n.14 (1977). 
 231. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 232. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 276 n.16 (citing United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 
674, 678 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
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been absorbed by amendments to FISA, the appellate court could 
have legitimately adopted it in light of its widespread application 
across the circuits when the alleged crimes were committed. Further, 
because the exception had not been rejected on the basis of a faulty 
interpretation of law—but rather was abandoned owing only to the 
difficulty of applying it in certain circumstances—adopting it in 
Terrorist Bombings would not have been unreasonable. More 
precisely, in a case arising after the district court’s decision, the 
foreign intelligence exception had essentially been rejected by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Review Court because of the 
exception’s requirement that a court determine whether a search had 
been conducted primarily for criminal or intelligence purposes. In 
this case, given the nature of the searches against El-Hage, and the 
fact that they concluded almost a full year before any of the crimes 
with which he was charged were carried to fruition, the government 
had a very strong argument that the searches were primarily related 
to intelligence collection. Indeed, this was the very argument the 
government had in fact made at both the district and appellate court 
levels and the argument that the district court had accepted. But, in 
rejecting the foreign intelligence exception, the Second Circuit 
essentially painted itself into a corner—if there was no easy way to 
obtain a warrant, then it had to either suppress critical evidence or 
determine that there must not be a warrant requirement.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note ends where it began; namely, with the recognition 
that “[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the 
guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law.”233 
Apparently the evidence against El-Hage was damning, and clearly 
his alleged crimes were horrific. It would certainly have been a 
travesty, therefore, to allow him to escape punishment if he were 
guilty. It is perhaps a greater tragedy, however, to trample the 
constitutional rights of those who are wrongly subjected to the 
overzealousness of mistaken or misguided U.S. law enforcement 
officials. Fortunately, there is a small ray of hope since, as currently 
constituted, FISA now directs that if a “significant portion” of a 
search is conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, then a FISA 
 
 233. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing United States 
v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 674–75 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
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order is required even for searches against U.S. persons abroad.234 
The problem is that in not applying the foreign intelligence 
exception in Terrorist Bombings—regardless of its subsequent 
mootness after the events of the case—the Second Circuit stripped 
U.S. citizens abroad of their Fourth Amendment rights even for 
searches carried out during the course of criminal investigations. 
Hopefully, courts in other circuits will realize the impropriety of this 
decision and will decline to adopt it. In the meantime, U.S. citizens 
abroad will have to hope that they are not subject to investigations 
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